

DEF 5/108

187005

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of..... C. C.

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 54

COPIES OF THIS DOCUMENT MUST NOT BE MADE WITHOUT THE  
AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

S.O.S.(60)325

14TH NOVEMBER, 1960.

LIMITED CIRCULATION

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CORRELATION OF TRIPARTITE MILITARY ACTIONS THAT  
CAN BE TAKEN TO MAINTAIN ACCESS TO BERLIN (S)Copy of a letter (Reference ECHO 600/28 Dated  
18th October 1960, from General Lauris Norstad  
U.S.A.F. to the United Kingdom, Chiefs of Staff)

Inclosed is a LIVE OAK study correlating two earlier papers on tripartite military actions for maintaining access to Berlin. The conclusions reached may be useful to the Tripartite governments in further planning on the Berlin issue.

2. I note particularly the conclusion that all military actions, from an initial probe of Soviet intentions on the autobahn to a final resort to thermonuclear war, must be incorporated in a single plan and not considered as separate, unrelated actions. Further, I note the conclusion that this plan should be ready for implementation before the probe is launched.

3. Next, while it is basic, LIVE OAK'S observation that military considerations must be integrated with political, economic and psychological factors underlines the need for early government-level planning.

4. With reference to Conclusions, paragraph 6e, concerning prior publicity for the probe, I have prepared proposals which I will forward by separate communication.

5. I consider that this study may be useful in completing integrated tripartite planning to maintain access to Berlin.

(Signed) LAURIS NORSTAD  
General USAF

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

14TH NOVEMBER, 1960.

\*LIVE OAK Study: "Initial Probe of Soviet Intentions," 13 May 59  
and  
LIVE OAK Study: "More Elaborate Military Measures," 24 July 59.

TOP SECRET

REFE 5/108

187005

## TOP SECRET

ECLO 300/135

1 October 1960

CORRELATION OF LIVE OAK STUDIES  
RELATING TO MAINTAINING ACCESS TO BERLIN (S)

## 1. INTRODUCTION

a. To comply with the intent and purpose of the Tripartite Basic Document, "Berlin Contingency Planning", 4 April 1959. LIVE OAK produced two studies pertaining to Berlin access planning:

- (1) An Initial Probe of Soviet Intentions, 13 May 59.
- (2) More Elaborate Military Measures, 24 July 59.

b. A review of those studies indicated a need for two further studies:

- (1) Possible Soviet reactions to an initial probe.
- (2) Time required to implement each of the More Elaborate Military Measures.

These further studies have revealed the problem which is examined below.

2. PROBLEM. To correlate tripartite military actions that can be taken to maintain access to Berlin.

3. ASSUMPTION. The Three Governments intend to bring Berlin access planning to a state of completion and agreement from which any portions of the planning may be executed if required.

4. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

a. Paragraph 10 of the Tripartite Basic Document states that if an initial probe (to determine whether the Soviets are prepared to use force or to permit the use of force to prevent Allied passage on the autobahn to Berlin) is physically obstructed, the Three Powers will intensify their military preparations.

b. Paragraph 13c of the same document assigns to a tripartite military planning group (LIVE OAK) in Paris, responsibility for studying measures which might be taken to restore freedom of access.

5. DISCUSSION.

a. (1) A study has been made of possible Soviet reactions to an initial probe. This study is attached at Annex 1.

(2) A probe of Soviet intentions on the autobahn could be inconclusive unless facts concerning the probe and its objective were made public prior to launching this limited military effort. Were the circumstances surrounding the probe kept classified, or were the Kremlin to be notified of the probe only through covert diplomatic channels, the chance of accomplishing the objective would be minimized. If the probe were obstructed or assaulted, the Soviets could claim no prior

- \* Berlin Contingency Planning, 4 April 1959 (French)
- OSB 541/10/4/59 (United Kingdom)
- JCS EM 366/59, 7 April 1959 (United States)

Reference:-

DEFE 5/108

157005

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

## TOP SECRET

knowledge of this "apparent invasion of East Germany", while actually directing their own or East German elements to obstruct the probe. To avoid this, it seems essential:

(a) To warn the Soviets before a probe is launched that the Tripartite Powers will tolerate no further interference of any type on the autobahn, during or after the probe.

(b) To develop a tripartitely agreed public relations policy with regard to the probe well in advance of initiating any such effort.

(b) (1) A probe could meet with many pitfalls causing failure to achieve the object. For example:

(a) The Soviets could allow the probe to pass from Helmsstedt to Berlin and immediately thereafter obstruct other traffic on the autobahn.

(b) The Soviets could block a lightly armed probe at some point on the autobahn refusing further movement and assert to the world that the probe had committed some illegal act enroute to Berlin.

(c) The Soviets could block the probe by using some form of traffic interference which would not clearly reveal a deliberate intention to be obstructive. Of the three types of probes (A, B and C) contemplated, A and B are not equipped to surmount major obstacles; Probe C, however, is designed either to break through or to by-pass any normal obstruction. Therefore, such a Soviet subterfuge would be more likely to succeed in blocking Probes A and B than Probe C.

(2) Before a decision is reached to execute a probe, it must be tripartitely understood that this action may lead to a final showdown with the Soviets and the Tripartite Powers must be agreed in their determination to assert their rights.

(3) The foregoing points to the need for a comprehensive plan for the implementation of selected more elaborate military measures to be ready before the probe is launched. This plan should cover the whole range from the probe to thermonuclear war.

c. A study of the time required to implement the More Elaborate Military Measures is at Annex 2. In this study the measures are grouped as capable of implementation in less, or more, than seven days. It is clear that some measures will not show practical results for a long time but the act of initiation will demonstrate tripartite determination and will, therefore, have some immediate effect. Although the great majority of the measures can be implemented in less than seven days, some important ones will take longer and should be ready prior to the execution of the probe.

d. To guarantee maintenance of access to Berlin, the military considerations must at some stage be integrated with political, economic and psychological factors.

6. CONCLUSIONS.

a. The initial probe needs prior publicity and for this an agreed tripartite policy is required.

TOP SECRET

b. Under certain circumstances the probe may not produce conclusive evidence of Soviet intentions to obstruct access. It should therefore, be considered the initial phase of a comprehensive plan whose aim would be to provide the Three Powers with a continuing military and psychological initiative over the Soviets and which should include a program of selected measures covering the whole range from probe to thermonuclear war.

c. The program should be ready for implementation before the probe is launched.

d. To guarantee maintenance of access to Berlin, pertinent political, economic and psychological factors must be integrated with military considerations prior to implementation of any of the latter.

Reference:-

REFE S/108

187005

GENERIC RECORD OFFICE

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

TOP SECRET

ANNEX I TO C.O.S.(60)325

REF 300/113

A STUDY OF POSSIBLE SOVIET REACTIONS TO AN  
INITIAL PROBE (S)

1

To determine possible Soviet reactions to a tripartite initial probe of Soviet intentions as outlined in LIVI OAK paper 'Berlin Contingency Planning: Initial Probe of Soviet Intentions', 13 May 1959.

GENERAL

1. For this study the following assumptions have been made:
  - a. The Soviets desire to avoid general war.
  - b. The Soviets realize that if the Western Powers are driven to war, it must inevitably be nuclear/thermonuclear.
  - c. The Soviets may try to insure that interference with Allied traffic is caused by, or appears to be caused by, the GDR.
2. The study commences from the point where Soviet/UDR action interfering with surface access has occurred to the degree justifying the mounting of a probe.

THE PROBE

1. The objective of the probe is to determine whether the Soviets are prepared to use force, or to permit the use of force to prevent the passage of an Allied convoy on the autobahn to Berlin. Force in this context is defined as any Soviet action which endangers the safety of the convoy or physically denies it passage by the use of obstacles including barriers, rubble, mines and civil or military forces. Threats will not be accepted as evidence of force.
2. Three alternative types of probes were considered. The three Governments intend to select the most appropriate type of probe in the light of circumstances existing at the time. Each probe is basically a convoy of tripartite vehicles, Probe 'A' being the simplest and Probe 'C' the most elaborate (including engineer support). The conditions under which each may be considered to have achieved the objective can be summed up as follows:
  - a. Probe 'A' - Withdraws if attacked. Accepts any obstacle/obstruction.
  - b. Probe 'B' - Takes defensive action, firing only if fired upon. Accepts obstacles/obstructions which cannot be removed by unarmed soldiers.
  - c. Probe 'C' - Takes defensive action, firing only if fired upon. Accepts obstacles/obstructions which cannot be breached or overcome by the convoy or its engineering equipment.

TOP SECRET

Reference: -

REFE 5/108

187005

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

TOP SECRET

6. Appendix 'A' shows in detail reactions which the Soviet/ODR could have to the probe and counteractions to be taken by the Probe Commander.

#### SOVIET APPRECIATION

7. Soviet Intelligence may or may not discover the assembly and training of the probe force and may or may not interpret tripartite intentions correctly. Possible reactions prior to the launching of the probe are studied in detail at Appendix 'B'. The composition of the probe and its available means of identification do not in themselves seem sufficient to insure Soviet/ODR recognition of the probe. Soviet failure, intentional or otherwise, to recognize the probe for what it is might result in it being treated in a way which could not be held indicative of Soviet intent. To give the probe the best chance of success, every possible measure must be taken to insure its certain identification for what it is. It will be essential to pass to the Kremlin, through diplomatic channels, full details of tripartite intentions before the probe is launched.

#### PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT

8. It will be highly desirable to make a public announcement:
  - a. To provide correct information to the ODR.
  - b. To minimize the possibility of Soviet misrepresentation.
  - c. To provide the best conditions for obtaining a Soviet reaction clearly revealing their intentions.
9. The notification and announcement could range from a simple statement identifying the probe to a clear definition of the Soviet reactions which a tripartite Powers could regard as intent to obstruct. The definition should not be in the form of an ultimatum forcing a Soviet choice between negotiation and war, since this is not the objective of the probe, nor can the probe guarantee in every circumstance an accurate indication of Soviet intent. The notification/announcement should be made in time to allow the Kremlin to issue orders concerning the probe but sufficiently late to minimize opportunity for Soviet propaganda.

#### TRIPARTITE PROGRAM

10. Following the tripartite decision to mount the initial probe, the likely program is:-
  - D minus 7 days - Probe force is called to assemble at Minden and commence essential training.
  - D minus 2 days - Public announcement of intent with a simultaneous diplomatic advice to the Kremlin.
  - D DAY - Probe launched.

#### SOVIET/ODR COURSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE PROBE

11. Three main courses of action are open to the Soviets:
  - a. To block the probe completely.

TOP SECRET

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Reference:

REFE 5/108

187005

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

## TOP SECRET

- b. To permit the probe uninterrupted passage.
  - c. To subject the probe to interference and delay but permit passage under protest.
12. To Block the Probe Completely.

This course is militarily feasible whatever the strength of the probe. It is a clearly defined action for which Soviet orders could almost certainly be issued in time after the tripartite announcement of D minus 2. This course implies Soviet acceptance of, or disbelief in, the likelihood of general war and its selection must rest on their political appreciation of these factors. From a tripartite standpoint this course would be a clear indication of intent, the aim of the probe would be achieved and more elaborate military measures should be initiated.

13. To Permit the Probe Uninterrupted Passage.

This is a militarily feasible course of action. Soviet orders for it could be issued in the time available after the tripartite announcement of D minus 2. Such a course might indicate indecision on the part of the Soviets or might arise from propaganda motives. It need not indicate any change of heart with regard to interference with normal traffic. To obviate this circumstance it must be made clear to the Soviets that any subsequent obstruction of traffic will be interpreted by the Tripartite Powers as evidence of Soviet intent to obstruct. If the Soviets adopt this course of action and then continue to obstruct traffic, it will be necessary to initiate more elaborate military measures.

14. To Subject the Probe to Interference and Delay but Permit Passage Under Protest.

This course of action is also militarily feasible. It might result from Soviet failure to issue any specific orders to the contrary or their non-response by executive personnel. It might also be the result of a deliberate political policy to ignore the probe. Possible Soviet actions under this heading range from those not readily identifiable as deliberate interference, such as obstacles, to more active police type action, such as patrols, extra checkpoints and imposition of procedures. Between these and the deliberate blocking of the probe there will be grades of forceful action and reaction governed more by individual human feeling at the time and place than by intent. Against our personnel will surely use their arms in self-defense and must be expected to show some form of physical opposition to the forceful overriding of their orders by the probe. Local action and reaction of this sort might, in fact, lead to the blocking of the probe without deliberate Soviet intent to do so.

INTELLIGENCE

15. From the foregoing it is clear that the Soviets have a wide range from which to select their reaction to the probe. Political motives which would accrue to the Soviet advantage will undoubtedly influence their decisions in this regard. At this time it is impossible to forecast what their decisions will be, but a concentrated intelligence effort preceding the execution of a probe may well indicate the most probable Soviet reaction.

Reference:-

REFE 5/108

187005

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

TOP SECRET

CONCLUSIONS

6. From the wide selection open to the Soviets, it is not possible at this time to determine with certainty their exact reaction to an initial ground probe.
7. The Soviet reaction will be governed principally by political motives.
8. To provide indications of Soviet reactions a concentrated intelligence effort should be undertaken.
9. To insure identification of the probe, it is essential to give the Kremlin prior diplomatic notice.
10. A public announcement of the tripartite intentions is also highly desirable:
  - a. To provide correct information to the CDR.
  - b. To minimize the possibility of Soviet misrepresentation of the probe.
  - c. To provide the best conditions for obtaining a Soviet reaction which clearly reveals their intentions.
11. The notification and announcement can range from a simple statement identifying the probe to a clear definition of Soviet reactions (not amounting to an ultimatum) which would be regarded as a declaration of intent to obstruct.



Reference:-									
REFE 5/108									
187005									
COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION									

TOP SECRET

/ECLO 300/1137.

Appendices A and B are to be circulated under cover of a Secretary's Minute COS. 1472/10/11/60.

- 9 -

TOP SECRET.

REFE 5/108

187005

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

## TOP SECRET

## ANNEX II TO COS(40)325

[SOLO 300/136]

TIME REQUIRED FOR IMPLEMENTING  
MORE ELABORATE MILITARY MEASURES (S)PROBLEM

To determine the time required to implement the More Elaborate Military Measures outlined in LIVE OAK paper "Berlin Contingency Planning: More Elaborate Military Measures (S)", revised version, 26 July 1959.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. a. That an initial probe of Soviet intentions has been taken along the autobahn from Wiesbaden to Berlin and has shown that the Soviets intend to obstruct Allied traffic.

b. That the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States intend to employ More Elaborate Military Measures against the Soviets to:

(1) Provide circumstances under which negotiations with the Soviets to restore access to Berlin might prove fruitful.

(2) Compel the Soviets to face the unmistakable imminence of general war should they persist in obstructing access to Berlin.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. a. The LIVE OAK Group was instructed to study "More Elaborate Military Measures" in April 1959. (See paragraph 16, Tripartite Basic Document, "Berlin Contingency Planning", 4 April 1959)\*.

b. The LIVE OAK paper "Berlin Contingency Planning: More Elaborate Military Measures (S)", including an appendix five groups of proposed measures, was submitted by General Horat to the Three National Chiefs of Staff under ACIO 600/7 on 5 August 1959.

DISCUSSION

4. a. In this study the time required to implement every measure listed in the appendices to the LIVE OAK paper "More Elaborate Military Measures" has been examined objectively. The measures have been grouped under two time headings, those requiring less than seven days to implement and those requiring a longer period. It is clear that some measures, although quick to initiate, will not show practical results for a long time but the act of initiation will demonstrate tripartite determination and must, therefore, have some immediate effect.

\* Berlin Contingency Planning, 4 April 1959 (French)  
COS 541/10/4/59 (United Kingdom)  
JCS BR 300/59, 7 April 1959 (United States)

Reference:-

REFE 5/108

187005

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

## TOP SECRET

b. Many of the measures require a redeployment or reinforcement of personnel and the provision of material. It seems probable that there may be conflict between these needs and those of preparation for a major NATO war.

c. While the examination of the appendices has been applied to each measure individually, the LIVE OAK Group is convinced that application of a few selected measures will not achieve the desired pressure on the Soviets but that a high proportion of the measures must be applied together in a concerted effort.

d. Most of the measures have political, economic and psychological facets whose study is not possible within LIVE OAK

CONCLUSIONS

a. The great majority of the measures can be implemented in less than seven days but some important ones will take longer and may, therefore, have to be ready prior to the execution of the probe.

b. Almost all the measures have political, economic and psychological facets which cannot be studied within LIVE OAK